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The Anthropocentric Advantage?  





Environmental ethicists often criticize liberalism. For, many liberals embrace 
anthropocentric theories on which only humans have non-instrumental value. 
Environmental ethicists argue that such liberals fail to account for many things that 
matter or provide an ethic sufficient for addressing climate change. These critics suggest 
that many parts of nature -- non-human individuals, other species, ecosystems and the 
biosphere have a kind of value beyond what they contribute to human freedom (or other 
things of value). This article suggests, however, that if environmental ethics are inclusive 
and also entail that concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for 
others, they have a different problem. For, when there are many things of value, figuring 
out what to do can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is likely to cause 
problems for many parts of nature it will probably be good for some other parts. Inclusive 
environmental ethicists need a theory taking all of the things they care about into account 
to provide definitive reason even to address climate change. Without this theory, 
anthropocentric liberals might argue that we should not accept an inclusive 
environmental ethic. Although there may be something wrong with this line of thought, it 








Liberalism is defined by a commitment to some kind of human freedom. There 
are many ways of understanding this commitment. Some theories start from a concern for 
each individual's positive freedoms or capabilities (Nussbaum 2007, 23-24). On others, 
negative freedoms (e.g. from arbitrary interference) are of primary importance (Lomasky 
1987, ch. 5; Machan 2001; Nozick 1974). Most liberal theories balance a concern for 
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different kinds of freedom against other things of value (Rawls 1971; Raz 1998). On 
most ways of understanding the commitment to human freedom at the heart of liberalism, 
however, it provides definitive reason to mitigate climate change. For, anthropogenic 
climate change threatens to undermine individuals’ basic capabilities and interfere with 
their negative freedoms. It threatens some individuals’ ability even to survive (Hassoun 
2009a; Jamieson 2005).  
Nevertheless, environmental ethicists often criticize liberalism. At least they 
criticize anthropocentric versions of liberalism on which only humans have non-
instrumental value.ii Environmental ethicists argue that such ethics fail to account for 
many things that matter and are not sufficient for addressing climate change.iii These 
critics suggest that many parts of nature -- non-human individuals, other species, 
ecosystems and the biosphere -- have a kind of value beyond what they contribute to 
human freedom (or other things of value).iv At least inclusive environmental ethicists, 
who believe concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for others, 
can object in this way to the anthropocentric liberals’ arguments. There is probably 
something to inclusive environmental ethics as well as the above critique of 
anthropocentric liberalism.  
Nevertheless, this article suggests that, when it comes to providing definitive 
reason to accept climate change policies, the problem might be on the side of inclusive 
environmental ethics. For, when there are many things of value, figuring out what to do 
can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is likely to cause problems for 
many parts of nature it will probably be good for some other parts. Inclusive 
environmental ethicists need a theory taking all of the things they care about into account 
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to provide definitive reason even to address climate change. Without this theory, 
anthropocentric liberals might argue that we should not accept an inclusive 
environmental ethic.   
Next, this article provides a tentative response to this last strand of argument. 
Although inclusive environmental ethicists cannot offer definitive reason to accept their 
preferred climate change policies, their theories might be developed further in order to 
provide this justification. Some such ethics even be developed enough right now that they 
will allow us to make all of the necessary choices on the ground when we need to make 
them. Moreover, this article argues, there is reason to be optimistic about the prospects 
for some inclusive environmental ethics to address climate change.  
Finally, the article suggests that whether or not everyone would accept its 
argument, it may be of interest even to those who reject inclusive environmental ethics. 
For many theories endorse more than one kind of value and lack principles for resolving 
all of the conflicts that may arise between these values. Indeed some anthropocentric 
liberal theories are also like this. So this article’s lessons may be important even for some 
liberals. 
Section 2 considers an argument anthropocentric liberals might give against 
inclusive environmental ethics. They might argue that we should reject inclusive 
environmental ethics because they are radically incomplete and cannot provide definitive 
reason even to address climate change. Section 3 considers a possible response to this 
argument. For, even if inclusive environmental ethicists cannot offer definitive reason to 
accept their preferred climate change policies, they might develop their theories further to 
provide this justification. Some such ethics even be developed enough right now that they 
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will allow us to make all of the necessary choices on the ground when we need to make 
them. Moreover, this section argues, there is reason to be optimistic about the prospects 
for some inclusive environmental ethics to address climate change. Finally, it suggests 
that its lessons may be important even for those who reject such ethics. 
2. An Argument Against Inclusive Environmental Ethics 
On inclusive environmental ethics, animals, plants, species, ecosystems and/or the 
biosphere have a kind of non-instrumental value.v Their value is not, for example, 
reducible to their value for human freedom or interests. Even if humans would benefit 
from clearing the wetlands for condominiums, for instance, inclusive environmental 
ethicists would object that that is not a definitive reason to let them. 
Granting that non-human individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth have non-
instrumental value does not settle any questions about what to do if there are other things 
of value at stake. If, for instance, protecting wetlands conflicts with humans’ interests in 
being free from malaria, it is not clear that we should preserve wetlands unaltered 
(Willott 2004).  
Some environmental ethicists go further, however, to argue that concern for some 
parts of nature does not always trump concern for others. Those who think non-human 
parts of nature have non-instrumental value, for instance, often argue that human 
freedoms (or interests) will not always trump concern for other things that matter.vi When 
there is conflict between minor human freedoms or interests and things of significant 
environmental value, it will be acceptable to do what is best for non-human parts of 
nature. One might argue, similarly, that concern for non-human individuals, species, 
ecosystems and so forth does not always trump concern for the other non-human parts of 
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nature. So, any way of dealing with climate change that only protects some parts of 
nature may fail to protect many things that matter.  
Some environmental ethicists are not inclusive (Schmidtz 2002c). Some think 
only some parts of nature have non-instrumental value or that concern for some parts of 
nature always trumps concern for other parts of nature (Singer 1993; Leopold 1949). 
Peter Singer, for instance, seems to think that other things only have value insofar as they 
are important for the interests of sentient creatures (Singer 1993). Similarly, Aldo 
Leopold suggests that we should care for individuals, species, and ecosystems only 
insofar as doing so promotes the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biosphere (Leopold 
1949; Callicott 1988; Attfield 1999).  
This article provides no objection to these ethics. For, many of these (less 
inclusive) environmental ethics can provide definitive reason to address climate change, 
at least in principle (Gardiner 2009a).vii On Singer’s theory, for instance, we might just 
need to choose the climate change policy that maximizes utility for all sentient 
creatures.viii 
This article only considers what someone who accepts the following propositions 
can say about climate change: 1) Many parts of nature -- individuals, species, ecosystems 
and so forth -- have some non-instrumental value and 2) concern for some of these things 
does not always trump concern for others. It argues that, because such inclusive 
environmental ethics are radically incomplete, they do not provide definitive reason even 
to address climate change right now.  
This inquiry is important, in part, because many environmental ethicists are at 
least inclined towards inclusive ethics. Few are explicit about whether or not they are 
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committed to the view. But, many environmental ethicists have at least some sympathy 
for components of the view (Hassoun 2009b; Jamieson 1997; Gardiner 2004; Carafo 
2002).ix Furthermore, it should be surprising if this article can show that inclusive 
environmental ethics cannot provide definitive reason even to address climate change 
right now. For, one might see much of the work in environmental ethics as providing 
resources from which inclusive environmental ethicists could draw in creating good 
climate change policy. One might even think that an inclusive environmental ethic would 
be the most promising basis for justifying environmentally friendly climate change policy 
right now. For, these ethics embrace many environmental values.  
 Inclusive Environmental Ethics and Climate Change Policyx 
It might initially seem that inclusive environmental ethicists can just add concern 
for all of the things they care about to an anthropocentric liberal theory to arrive at 
adequate climate change policy. Where, a climate change policy is just an answer to the 
question “What should humans do, if anything, about climate change?”.xi After all, 
environmental problems like climate change pose non-negligible risk of serious harm to 
many non-human individuals, species, and ecosystems (Gardiner 2004). In fact, there is 
mounting evidence that climate change is likely to cause significant problems for the 
majority of things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists (IPCC, 2007 2007, 20). 
Perhaps these ethicists can tell us that we not only have reason to address climate change 
when it threatens to undermine human freedom but when it threatens non-human 
individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth (Hassoun 2009b).  
Unfortunately, inclusive environmental ethicists cannot just add concern for all of 
the things they care about to an anthropocentric liberal theory to arrive at adequate 
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climate change policy.xii Although climate change may harm many individuals, species, 
ecosystems, and so forth, it may benefit yet other parts of nature in the process.xiii If, 
however improbably, anthropogenic climate change brings about the next ice age, arctic 
ecosystems and their inhabitants will flourish, though tropical ones and deserts will 
disappear.xiv However climate change alters the biosphere it will create problems for 
some (at least existingxv) individuals and species, but be good for others (Outwater 1996; 
Whyte 2002). Climate change will also have some positive and some negative effects on 
(existing) ecosystems and the biosphere (IPCC, 2007 2007, 20). Inclusive environmental 
ethics are radically incomplete; although they can provide some reasons in favor of 
mitigating climate change, they also provide reasons not to mitigate climate change. They 
provide similarly conflicting reasons for and against implementing more specific climate 
change policies. Inclusive environmental ethics do not tell us where the weight of reason 
lies. So they do not, right now, provide definitive reason even to address climate change. 
This argument is probably strongest when applied just to the choice between 
different mitigation strategies as opposed to the choice of mitigating vs. letting climate 
change proceed unchecked. Without a theory that is worked out in a lot of detail, it will 
be hard to tell whether it is best to, for instance, use solar energy or wind power to 
mitigate climate change. So, even if inclusive environmental ethicists do not have a 
problem justifying their choice of mitigating climate change (vs. not mitigating it), they 
might still have a problem in justifying the particular mitigation strategies they prefer. 
The problem for inclusive environmental ethicists only gets worse if they care 
about more than climate change’s impact on existing parts of nature. Consider beaver and 
elephants. Many environmental ethicists argue that beaver are important precisely 
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because they flood the plains and create wetlands, though some individuals that prefer 
plains suffer in the process (UN 2008). Similarly, some environmental ethicists want to 
protect elephants even though they threaten endangered species like rhino and baobab 
trees when they tear down forests (Hassoun and Wong forthcoming; Whyte 2002). These 
ethicists might maintain that elephants’ destruction is creative - they open the vast 
savannah, exerting adaptive pressure on other species, enriching the earth by creating 
new ecosystems (Norton 1987). Just as beavers create wetlands out of prairies and 
elephants create plains out of forests, climate change will replace some ecosystems with 
others. Climate change, like beavers and elephants, may open up new evolutionary 
niches, making ecosystems more dynamically and resiliently stable (Norton 2002).  
Climate change may even act like early cyanobacteria. These anaerobic 
photosynthesizers reproduced so prolifically that they used up most of the carbon dioxide 
existing individuals and species needed to survive (Croal 2005). In doing so, however, 
they produced a lot of oxygen, making it easier for aerobic organisms to evolve. Climate 
change may give life to a whole new world. Consider how one scientist put the point: 
To the conservation biologist, there is little positive to be said about 
extinction. From an evolutionary perspective, however, extinction is a 
double-edged sword. By definition, extinction terminates lineages and thus 
removes unique genetic variation and adaptations. But over geological 
time scales, it can reshape the evolutionary landscape in more creative 
ways, via the differential survivorship of lineages and the evolutionary 
opportunities afforded by the demise of dominant groups and the 
postextinction sorting of survivors (Jablonski 2001, 5393). 
 
Even extinction has its upside.xvi  
 Perhaps those who care about many things can reject this last move. Maybe they 
can justify taking a much more limited temporal perspective. They might, for instance, 
value different parts of nature over different time scales (Norton 2003).  
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There are two problems with this suggestion. First, it is not clear that inclusive 
environmental ethicists can provide a non-arbitrary way to value different parts of nature 
over different time scales. Second, even if they can do so, they may not be able to offer 
definitive reason to accept their preferred climate change policies. For, we have seen how 
climate change (and, hence, different climate change policies) will affect existing 
individuals, species, ecosystems, and so forth differently.xvii   
Nothing in the above argument (or the rest of this article) requires a commitment 
to consequentialism. As stated, the argument points to the different benefits and harms 
climate change will bring to existing individuals, species, and so forth. It can, however, 
be recast in different theoretical frameworks. So those who prefer to talk in terms of 
rights violations, for instance, can do so. Similarly, it does not matter if inclusive 
environmental ethicists deny that it is a good thing to bring new species, ecosystems, and 
so forth into existence.xviii As long as they grant that our actions impact at least existing 
individuals and so forth in ways that merit consideration, a revised version of the above 
argument will apply. 
 Finally, none of this commits those who care about many things to embracing a 
biocentric ethic on which most or all parts of nature (e.g. individuals or species) merit 
equal consideration or respect. So the problem for inclusive environmental ethics is not 
just a version of the problem that plagues (egalitarian) biocentric ethics (Taylor 1986; 
Davion 2006).xix Inclusive environmental ethicists who are not biocentrists need not be 
particularly concerned with “the morality of swatting pesky flies, mowing the lawn, [or] 
building patios” (Davion 2006, 126). For, recall that these ethicists need only hold the 
following propositions: 1) many parts of nature -- individuals, species, ecosystems and so 
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forth -- have some non-instrumental value and 2) concern for some of these things does 
not always trump concern for others.  
The problem for inclusive environmental ethics just stems from the fact that they 
are radically incomplete; although they can provide some reasons in favor of particular 
climate change policies, they also provide reasons not to implement those policies. They 
do not tell us where the weight of reason lies. Inclusive environmental ethicists do not 
have a complete theory that can tell us what to do about climate change. 
Objections, Replies, and the Anthropocentric Liberal’s Argument 
The rest of this section will consider several possible responses to the above 
argument. First, it will consider whether the current episode of climate change, because it 
is anthropogenic, is unlike other episodes of climate change in problematic ways. Next, it 
will consider arguments that emphasize the harm that climate change will cause many 
parts of nature. This section will conclude that none of these responses is successful. So, 
anthropocentric liberals may reject inclusive environmental ethics because they cannot 
provide definitive reason to accept their preferred climate change policies. 
Consider, first, how inclusive environmental ethicists might appeal to one of J. 
Baird Callicott’s arguments for addressing other anthropogenic environmental 
disturbances. Maybe “the problem with anthropogenic disturbances… is that they are far 
more frequent, widespread, and regularly occurring than are non-anthropogenic 
disturbances, they are well out of the spatial and temporal range of disturbances 
experienced by ecosystems over evolutionary time” (Callicott 2001, 215). Because the 
current episode of climate change is anthropogenic, it may be unnatural in a problematic 
way (Mathews 2002). 
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It is not clear, however, that anthropogenic climate change is likely to occur at 
different spatial and temporal scales than non-anthropogenic climate change. In fact, we 
know that the climate has changed just as rapidly in the past as it appears to be changing 
now and scientists predict similar results (National Environmental Satellite, Data, and 
Information Service 2008). So Callicott’s argument does not work in the present case, 
even though many other anthropogenic disturbances occur at different spatial and 
temporal scales than corresponding non-anthropogenic disturbances. 
Even if anthropogenic climate change is different in some respects from past 
climatic shifts, that may be good. These differences may benefit some species or 
ecosystems, for instance. Nor will it help to grant that natural processes are better than 
anthropogenic ones (a difficult proposition to support). Inclusive environmental ethicists 
believe many things matter besides processes. So, more argument is necessary to 
conclude that it is wrong for us to alter the climate. 
Inclusive environmental ethicists might argue that it does not matter what good 
our actions do for individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth. Perhaps what matters is 
that we do not harm these things. Since the current episode of climate change is 
anthropogenic, we are harming some individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth. So, 
perhaps, we have reason to stop contributing to climate change and, perhaps, to mitigate 
the damage we have caused. 
It is at least plausible, however, that we should sometimes promote the interests of 
sentient creatures, preserve species, and restore ecosystems or the biosphere. Even some 
who do not qualify as animal rights activists argue, for instance, that we should promote 
 12 
our pets’ health (Calicott 1988). Others suggest preserving species threatened by non-
anthropogenic environmental problems (Jamieson 1997).xx 
Further, mitigation will harm some of the things that matter to inclusive 
environmental ethicists. If, for instance, people started using solar energy rather than 
fossil fuels to mitigate climate change, that would probably harm some ecosystems and 
species. For, photovoltaic panels contain some toxic semi-conducting materials (US 
Department of Energy 2009).xxi In fact, mitigation will harm some parts of nature on any 
plausible baseline for harm.xxii It will make some individuals, species, ecosystems and so 
forth worse off than they would have been if we had never emitted any green house 
gasses. It will even make some of these things worse off than they would have been if we 
had never been on the planet at all. Some birds that fly into the wind-farms would have 
survived, but for our having existed, caused climate change, and put up the farms to 
mitigate its impact.xxiii  
Perhaps inclusive environmental ethicists can defend mitigation (in general), even 
with an incomplete ethic. They might give something like the following argument in 
favor of mitigation.  
1) There will be more harms and more severe harms to things that matter if we 
do not mitigate climate change than if we do. 
2) On inclusive environmental ethics there is an obligation not to harm 
individuals, species, ecosystems, and so forth. 
C) So, we should mitigate climate change. 
Inclusive environmental ethicists might suggest that they do not need to say any more 
because, given their commitments, it is easy to see why mitigation is necessary.  
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Even if this argument for mitigation in general goes through, inclusive 
environmental ethicists may still have a problem justifying the particular climate change 
policies they prefer. For, much more detail may be necessary to arbitrate between these 
strategies.  
It is not clear, however, that the above argument can even support mitigation in 
general. It contains an important ambiguity. It is possible to understand its first premise in 
two ways – as implicitly normative or purely descriptive. If it is implicitly normative and 
is supposed to entail that the harms climate change will bring are impermissible, it 
requires more defense. Why think the number and kind of harms climate change will 
bring will be greater in any morally relevant sense than the number and kind of harms 
mitigation will bring? If the claim that the number and kind of harms climate change will 
bring will be greater than those of mitigation is purely descriptive, however, then it is not 
clear why 1) and 2) are supposed to entail 3). To make this argument valid, rather than 2), 
inclusive environmental ethics require something like: 
3) If there will be more harms and more severe harms to things that matter if we 
do not mitigate climate change than if we do, we should mitigate. 
But then we return to our original question: Why do the number and severity of the harms 
that will occur if we do not mitigate outweigh or trump the other harms (and possibly 
benefits) that mitigation will bring? If inclusive environmental ethicists want to engage 
with others who do not agree that we must mitigate climate change for this reason, they 
must answer this question. They cannot just appeal to 3) -- the brute principle that we 
should mitigate the greatest number and most severe harms in this case. Nor can inclusive 
environmental ethicists simply assert that any reasonable environmental ethic has to 
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provide reason to mitigate climate change (Shue 2008; Hassoun 2009b; Jamieson 1997; 
Gardiner 2004).xxiv They need an explanation to engage with others who do not simply 
see this truth, not just a desideratum.  
Although nothing we have said so far demands that inclusive environmental 
ethicists adopt consequentialism, they might do so to support the third premise above.xxv 
On some versions of consequentialism, for instance, we should minimize the sum of 
harm. These ethicists could then give the above argument in favor of mitigating climate 
change.xxvi  
We need to know more about the kind of consequentialism at issue to decide 
whether it is plausible, however. Do all individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth 
count equally? Or, do harms to some things (e.g. humans) count more than harms to other 
things (e.g. mosquitoes)? How much more?  
Environmental ethicists have done some work that might provide answers to these 
questions. Inclusive environmental ethicists might, for instance, appeal to Paul Taylor’s 
work on how to weigh and balance the interests of members of different species. For, his 
theory is perhaps the most developed (though Taylor does not qualify as a 
consequentialist or an inclusive environmental ethicist). He gives a deontological theory 
and does not think species, ecosystems, or the biosphere have non-instrumental value. 
Taylor suggests a version of species egalitarianism but he argues that, in cases of conflict, 
it is acceptable to sacrifice nonhuman interests for basic human interests (Taylor 1981, 
264-265). He believes humans can invoke a right to self-defense in such cases as long as 
they try to minimize these conflicts. In other cases, he suggests satisfying only non-basic 
human interests that are compatible with an attitude of respect for nature in the least 
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harmful way. He also believes we should advance the basic interests of all equally and 
compensate for undue harms and unjust inequalities in the distribution of resources 
(Taylor 1981). 
Taylor’s principles are not plausible, however. It is not clear, for instance, that we 
should be so egalitarian. As David Schmidtz points out, species egalitarianism seems to 
suggest that it often makes no difference what we kill (Schmidtz 2002c, 97). It is not 
plausible to think that killing a cow or a turnip carries the same moral weight. Nor is it 
clear that we should be just as inclined to do research on a chimpanzee as a mouse. 
Even if some inclusive ethicists disagree, however, and want to embrace such 
egalitarianism, they must say more. Otherwise, they cannot provide a complete 
justification even for mitigating climate change. They must explain how to take the non-
instrumental value of species, ecosystems, and the biosphere into account as well as the 
interests of individuals. 
Unless I am overlooking something in the environmental ethics literature, 
inclusive environmental ethicists must do further work to justify the climate change 
policies they prefer.xxvii Even to decide whether climate change is generally good or bad, 
they need an account of how much each of its effects matters or which considerations 
trump all others. Would it be bad if climate change caused massive extinctions but 
increased biodiversity, benefitting the biosphere? Would it be good if climate change 
saved some species from extinction but harmed many individuals in the process? While 
this article will say more about the answers to these questions below, they are difficult 
and divisive (Schmidtz 2002a; Schmidtz 2002c; Rolston, 2002; Singer, 1993). There is 
no well worked out theory that takes into account all of the things inclusive 
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environmental ethicists care about and provides determinate answers to all of these 
questions.xxviii So, inclusive environmental ethics are radically incomplete; although they 
can provide some reasons in favor of particular climate change policies, they also provide 
reasons not to implement those policies. They do not tell us where the weight of reason 
lies.  
Because inclusive environmental ethics are radically incomplete, even if the 
climate change policies their advocates prefer are morally permissible, inclusive 
environmental ethics cannot justify these policies right now. Even worse, a different (e.g. 
anthropocentric liberal) theory may provide this justification. So, anthropocentric liberals 
might conclude that this argument gives us reason to reject inclusive environmental 
ethics.  
3. Response to the Argument Against Inclusive Environmental Ethics 
This section responds to the anthropocentric liberals’ argument. It suggests that, 
even if inclusive environmental ethicists cannot offer definitive reason to accept their 
favorite climate change policies right now, such ethics might be developed further so that 
they can justify climate change policies in the future. Moreover, inclusive environmental 
ethics may, right now, provide all the resources we need for an adequate response to 
climate change. Finally, this section argues that there is reason to be optimistic about the 
prospects for some inclusive environmental ethics to address climate change. 
The anthropocentric liberal’s argument went something like this: 
1. There is no compelling inclusive environmental ethic that takes into account 
all of the relevant considerations and tells us what to do about climate change.  
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2. So even if the climate change policies their advocates prefer are morally 
permissible, they cannot be justified by inclusive environmental ethics. 
3. Hence, we should reject inclusive environmental ethics. 
There are different ways of locating the problem with this argument. Initially, the 
move from this argument’s first to second premise might seem most questionable. This 
article has only argued that inclusive environmental ethicists cannot provide definitive 
reason to accept their preferred climate change policies right now. Interpreting the second 
premise in this way, however, the argument’s biggest problem is in the move from this 
premise to its conclusion. For, it is possible that their ethics can be developed enough to 
provide all the resources we need for an adequate response to climate change. Some such 
ethics even be developed enough right now that they allow us to make all of the 
necessary choices on the ground when we need to make them. Suppose, for instance, that 
climate change would expand the range of a species in the Sonoran desert that would 
otherwise hover on the verge of extinction. An inclusive environmental ethic may give us 
reason to mitigate climate change and protect that species in another way. We might, for 
instance, be able to protect the species by expanding the Sonoran National Park. Of 
course, creating a nature reserve will require (scarce) resources, but it is far from clear 
that we cannot both mitigate climate change and create the necessary reserves etc. There 
may be policies that can mitigate any important conflicts between the things that matter 
to inclusive environmental ethicists.  
Anthropocentric liberals might argue, however, that we should reject inclusive 
environmental ethics because no climate change policy will be morally permissible on 
any such ethic. This article started by assuming that there will be winners and losers from 
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climate change policies. If this assumption is reasonable, anthropocentric liberals might 
argue, so is the assumption that no climate change policy will be morally permissible on 
any inclusive environmental ethic. On inclusive environmental ethics (almost) everything 
matters. Climate change is a global problem likely to impact almost all of these things. 
There are limited resources for dealing with environmental problems. Though we might 
be able to protect the climate and wetlands, we cannot protect the climate and everything 
else that matters to inclusive environmental ethicists.  
The scope of climate change and inclusive environmental ethicists’ concern 
certainly makes it seem likely that no climate change policy will be morally permissible 
on any inclusive environmental ethic. But, just as global problems present many 
challenges, the global scope of possible policy responses to these problems present many 
ways of addressing these challenges. In a small community, for instance, it may turn out 
that it is only possible to protect the environment or jobs (e.g. logging may be the only 
viable industry in the area). If the loggers can get different jobs in the city, however, that 
might be morally permissible on an inclusive environmental ethic.xxix The claim that no 
climate change policy will be morally permissible on any inclusive environmental ethic is 
unwarrantedly strong. Though we might not be able to protect the climate and everything 
else that matters, there may be some morally permissible policies on some inclusive 
environmental ethics.  
Besides, the fact that a theory is incomplete and cannot provide definitive reason 
to accept any climate change policies right now is not a reason to reject it. For many 
theories are incomplete without being valueless. Incomplete theories may provide insight. 
They may even provide important guidance. Inclusive environmental ethics tell us a lot 
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about the nature of environmental value and provide reasons (though, perhaps, not 
definitive reasons) in favor of many policies. Theoretical incompleteness may just be a 
reason to reject a theory’s application, rather than the theory itself.xxx  
Finally, inclusive environmental ethicists might even go further to argue that we 
should be optimistic about the prospects for some inclusive environmental ethics to 
address climate change. Without a complete theory, it is not clear how inclusive 
environmental ethicists can provide a deductive argument for this conclusion. They 
might, however, challenge a common presumption that may undergird the 
anthropocentric liberal’s skepticism. Inclusive environmental ethicists might challenge 
the presumption that it is often impossible to protect all of the things that matter to them. 
In doing so, they can also illustrate a general strategy for addressing climate change – 
implementing their preferred policies and addressing potential problems as they arise. 
Many environmental ethicists (amongst others) presume that it is often impossible 
to protect all of the things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists (Rolston 2002; 
Sagoff 1984; Callicott 1980). Some presume, for instance, that we must choose between 
protecting people and other parts of nature. Others argue that we must sometimes choose 
whether to protect individuals or species and ecosystems (Schmidtz 2002a; Schmidtz 
2002b). If this article can provide reasons to doubt these authors’ examples, 
anthropocentric liberals should think twice before they assert that there will be 
insurmountable difficulties in dealing with climate change. 
Consider, first, how it is possible to respond to the claim that there is no way to 
protect people’s basic interests (including their interest in freedom) and other parts of 
nature (Rolston 2002). David Schmidtz makes the case that the interests of people and 
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nature align much more closely than many have thought. He does this by considering the 
purported conflict between preservationist and conservationist theories (Schmidtz 2002a; 
Schmidtz 2002b). Preservationists often argue for “no use” policies because they believe 
we should preserve nature (protecting it even if doing so is not in human interests). 
Conservationists often argue for “wise use” policies that conserve nature (protecting it 
whenever doing so is in human’s interests). Schmidtz suggests that we must sometimes 
preserve nature to conserve it. In some circumstances, wise use may be no use at all. It 
may not be wise to even consider using nature if there is some risk that doing so will 
expose us to unknown dangers. But, Schmidtz suggests, to really protect nature, we 
sometimes have to use it wisely. Hunting may, for instance, be a good way of protecting 
elephants. Hunters will pay to maintain nature reserves that would otherwise be turned 
into towns (Schmidtz 2002a; Schmidtz 2002b).xxxi 
Schmidtz suggests that the real tension is not between saving people and nature 
but between saving non-human individuals and protecting species and ecosystems. He 
recalls the debate between animal rights activists and forest rangers concerned about 
species preservation and the Yellowstone ecosystem. When a herd of sheep in 
Yellowstone got pink-eye, the rangers did not save the sheep. They let nature take its 
course. Animal rights activists were incensed especially since, a few years before, the 
rangers had gone to heroic lengths to save a grizzly and her cub trapped on a quickly 
melting island of ice. The rangers argued, however, that it was important to save the 
grizzly and let the sheep die to preserve the health of the species and the Yellowstone 
ecosystem. Similarly, Schmidtz argues, only animal rights activists should object to 
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hunting in national parks when hunting is the best way to preserve wildlife (Schmidtz 
2002a; Schmidtz 2002b).  
But, even the tension between animal rights activists and others who care about 
nature may be overstated (Callicott 1980; Sagoff 1984; Callicott 1988). Perhaps animal 
rights activists could have convinced the rangers to let them transport the sheep to 
another reserve capable of supporting them (perhaps Yosemite was low on sheep). And, 
if the rangers’ objection was to letting the sheep reproduce in the wild at all (perhaps their 
main concern was about the natural evolution of the species) the sheep might be sterilized 
first or kept as pets. Similarly, eco-tourism rather than hunting in Africa might preserve 
both individual animals and other parts of the natural world. And some argue that even 
animal rights activists should sometimes support killing or letting individuals die (Varner 
1995). 
The cases above illustrate how we might sometimes protect all of the things that 
matter on some inclusive environmental ethics even though it is common to assume that 
we cannot. They provide some (admittedly tentative) reasons for optimism. For, they 
illustrate how there are overlooked alternatives to many purportedly irresolvable conflicts 
between protecting things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists. The above 
cases demonstrate how some such ethics can resolve a range of environmental 
problems.xxxii They illustrate a general strategy addressing climate change – dealing with 
potential problems for climate change policies as they arise – what conservation 
biologists call adaptive management. To pursue adaptive management policy makers 
tentatively implement a policy, test its impact on different variables of interest, and then 
repeat the process until they find an acceptable policy.xxxiii Perhaps inclusive 
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environmental ethicists can use this strategy to address climate change. They might look 
at how the policies they implement affect everything they care about and try to adjust 
them in light of the evidence. There is reason for optimism. 
Some inclusive environmental ethicists cannot produce permissible climate 
change policies. An inclusive environmental ethicist who holds, for instance, that we can 
never harm individuals may not be able to license any climate change policies. Almost 
any climate change policy we implement will harm some individuals (recall the bird and 
the windmill). Nevertheless, some inclusive environmental ethics can probably license 
some climate change policies. 
Perhaps the above argument presupposes that inclusive environmental ethicists 
have a theory that can justify climate change policy. After all, if it is possible to say that 
some policies are acceptable, they must have a principle explaining why that is so. The 
set of principles licensing an acceptable policy is just what inclusive environmental 
ethicists were supposed to be missing. 
For the above argument to work, it must be the case that some plausible inclusive 
environmental ethics could endorse the policies suggested above. But, that is not the 
same as presupposing a complete inclusive environmental ethic. Rather, the above 
arguments suggest that such an ethic might, plausibly, support these policies. (There may 
be many plausible ethics that would support these policies.)xxxiv  
Perhaps one could argue that this section provides, rather than presupposes, the 
complete inclusive ethic the previous section claimed was missing. Maybe we should 
pursue adaptive management. Perhaps we should implement the policies that seem most 
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reasonable in light of existing evidence and theories and then address any problems that 
arise for things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists (Lee 1999).  
Although I would be happy if this were so, it is not clear that this section has 
completely dissipated the problem for inclusive environmental ethics. Nor, without a 
much more developed theory, is it clear that these ethics can provide definitive reason to 
attempt adaptive management. Adaptive management seems utterly reasonable in the 
present case, but some of the things that matter on inclusive environmental ethics might 
do better if we took a different approach (Lee 1999). The arguments above just provide 
reason to be optimistic about the prospects for such ethics to adequately address climate 
change. Inclusive environmental ethicists may be able to advocate adaptive management 
but there may be other ways of addressing climate change they could reasonably support 
as well.xxxv 
To recap, this section suggested that the anthropocentric liberals’ argument for 
rejecting inclusive environmental ethics traded on an ambiguity. Although inclusive 
environmental ethicists cannot offer definitive reason to accept their preferred climate 
change policies, their theories might be developed further in order to provide this 
justification. To reject such ethics anthropocentric liberals must deny the follow claim: If 
1) there is no reason to think the theory can never justify good climate change policies, 2) 
it may be acceptable even if it is incomplete and cannot provide these policies right now. 
Furthermore, this section suggested that we should be especially hesitant to reject 
incomplete theories when 3) they provide some important guidance or 4) we have reason 
to be optimistic about their prospects for providing all of the guidance we need. This 
section argued that inclusive environmental ethics may be able to provide justification for 
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good policy responses to climate change. It also argued that they may provide some 
guidance right now and we have reason to be optimistic about their prospects for 
providing all of the guidance we need. So, inclusive environmental ethicists might 
maintain their theories, even though they are incomplete and cannot tell us what to do 
about climate change right now. 
This article’s lessons might generalize beyond inclusive environmental ethics. 
Any incomplete pluralistic theory, on which more than one thing matters, may face a 
problem similar to the problem that afflicts inclusive environmental ethics. Unless a 
theory is comprehensive -- explaining how all of the things that matter should be taken 
into account -- it may not provide definitive reason to accept any climate change 
policies.xxxvi Even some anthropocentric liberal theories may have this problem. The 
climate change policy that best promotes some human freedoms may undermine others. 
Depending on how emissions permits are allocated, this response to climate change may 
make it more difficult for some to secure important positive freedoms or basic 
capabilities.xxxvii Liberal theories concerned about both the freedom to trade and basic 
capabilities must tell us how we should take these freedoms into account when it is 
difficult to protect both. Otherwise, they cannot provide a definitive evaluation of policies 
like these. 
Inclusive environmental ethics are, however, more likely to suffer from the kind 
of problem this article has sketched than anthropocentric liberal ones. For, some 
anthropocentric liberal theories only embrace a concern for one kind of human freedom. 
Inclusive environmental ethics are, by definition, concerned about more than one 
thing.xxxviii  
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Furthermore, even though inclusive environmental ethics are not the only ethics 
that have the problem this paper has sketched, that they have it is both surprising and 
significant. For, until now, environmental ethicists have been the ones worrying that their 
competitors cannot adequately address climate change, rather than the other way around. 
Moreover, in virtue of their comprehensiveness, one might have expected inclusive 
environmental ethics to be best for dealing with climate change. But it is precisely 
because these ethics are comprehensive that they have this problem.  
Finally, though the kind of problem this article has set out for inclusive 
environmental ethicists is general, at least the core of its response to the anthropocentric 
liberal’s argument is general as well. It is not clear that we should reject a theory just 
because it cannot right now provide definitive reason to accept any climate change 
policies. Rather, such theories might be developed further so that they can justify some 
climate change policies. Moreover, such theories might be able to tell us how to make all 
of the decisions that we must actually make on the ground. So, if there are good reasons 
to believe what these theories do say, creativity rather than despair may be on order.xxxix 
4. Conclusion 
Many versions of liberalism give us definitive reason to mitigate climate change. 
Environmental ethicists argue, however, that at least anthropocentric versions of 
liberalism do not account for many things that matter. These critics suggest that 
individuals of other species, species, ecosystems and so forth have a kind of value beyond 
what they contribute to protecting human freedom. Further, on inclusive environmental 
ethics, concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for others. 
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This article has argued that, although there is probably something to inclusive 
environmental ethics, they have a different problem. When there are many things of 
value, figuring out what to do can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is 
likely to harm many species and ecosystems, for instance, it will probably benefit some. 
Inclusive environmental ethicists lack a compelling theory taking all these different 
considerations into account. Without this theory they cannot provide definitive reason to 
accept their preferred climate change policies. So, anthropocentric liberals might 
conclude, that we should not accept such ethics.  
This article does not provide a solution to the inclusive environmental ethicists’ 
problem – they lack a complete and plausible theory that can provide definitive reason to 
accept any climate change policies right now. It does, however, suggest that 
anthropocentric liberals cannot use this conclusion to conclude that we should reject 
inclusive environmental ethics. Inclusive environmental ethics might be developed to 
justify the climate change policies their proponents prefer. Further, their theories may 
provide all the resources we need for an adequate response to climate change right now.  
To support this last line of thought, this article considered how inclusive 
environmental ethicists might go further to argue that we should be optimistic about the 
prospects for some inclusive environmental ethics to address climate change. The 
environmental ethics literature is replete with purported dilemmas for such ethics. Some 
argue, for instance, that we must either save people or nature (Rolston 2002). Others 
suggest that we must choose between saving individuals and saving species or 
ecosystems (Schmidtz 2002b). This section argued, however, that we should not assume 
that such conflicts are irresolvable. When we lack a complete theory, it may be best to try 
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to come up with creative responses to environmental problems compatible with the moral 
knowledge we do have. We may, for instance, find good policies that can protect all of 
the things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists. Suppose the best alternative 
energy source harms some valuable ecosystems -- say, wetlands. A good climate change 
policy might rely upon that energy source, while at the same time advancing wetland 
conservation programs. It will probably be hard for inclusive environmental ethicists to 
decide what to do about climate change, but we should not assume that inclusive 
environmental ethics cannot justify doing anything. 
I am not entirely sure the problem this article raises for inclusive environmental 
ethics is genuine. Nor am I sure that the suggested response to the anthropocentric 
liberal’s claim that this problem gives us reason to reject inclusive environmental ethics 
is a good one. Nevertheless, I hope that this article’s arguments merit response and 
further exploration. Moreover, whether or not these arguments work in the present case, 
they may be of interest even to those who reject inclusive environmental ethics. For many 
theories endorse more than one kind of value and lack principles for resolving all of the 
conflicts that may arise between these values. Even some anthropocentric liberal theories 
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nhassoun@andrew.cmu.edu 
ii One might, of course, deny that anything has non-instrumental value, but this article will not address this kind 
of skepticism. 
iii Non-anthropocentric environmental ethicists believe that humans are not the only things that matter. See 
(Schmidtz 2002d) for discussion.  
iv For criticism of liberal ethics see (Gardiner 2009a; Gardiner 2009b; Hayward, 2009). Gardiner gives a 
sophisticated critique of John Rawls’ theory in particular and political theories more generally. In his general 
criticism of liberalism he raises this problem, although the thrust of his critique is somewhat different.  
v By endorsing the claim that some things have non-instrumental value, environmental ethicists need not be 
committing themselves to any meta-ethical views. For discussion see: (Schmidtz and Willott, 2002).  
vi Richard Routley’s last man argument is perhaps the most famous argument in support of this conclusion 
(Schmidtz & Willott, 2002). 
vii There are also many ways of resolving the inclusive environmental ethicists’ problem. This article will 
suggest, however, that inclusive environmental ethicists lack the theory that will allow them to resolve it. See 
(Gardiner 2009a) for critique of high-level solutions to the climate change problem.   
viii His ethic would, presumably, require radical action to address climate change. 
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ix Certainly, many agree that individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth have non-instrumental value 
(Jamieson 1997; Gardiner 2004; Moriarty, 2006; Hassoun and Wong forthcoming). Though it is not always clear 
whether these environmental ethicists think concern for one of these things always trumps concern for others. I 
am pretty sure, for instance, that Gardiner thinks many things have non-instrumental value but it is not clear 
whether they think concern for one of these things always trumps concern for others. Carafo is obviously 
concerned about individuals and ecosystems and it is pretty clear that he does not think concern for human 
interests always trumps concern for other parts of nature. Some deep ecologists probably also endorse an 
inclusive environmental ethic (though those who commit to the Gaia hypothesis, for instance, may be better 
classified as biocentrists) (Naess 2005). Even if, however, no one was an inclusive environmental ethicist this 
article may be of interest. For, it at least illustrates some challenges for those who might be inclined to adopt the 
position. 
x This section draws heavily on (Hassoun 2009a). 
xi This article talks about how humans, collectively, affect the natural world and about what climate change 
policy humanity should embrace mainly to avoid worries about the non-identity problem and worries about 
responsibility for very small (e.g. individual) contributions to climate change. Note, however, that even the green 
house gasses individuals emit will probably impact some existing individuals, species, and ecosystems. For, it 
takes only a few years for CO2 emissions to affect the surface temperature of the ocean, for instance (Adams, 
2009). 
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xii Of course, environmental ethicists might also decide not to mitigate climate change but to help those 
negatively impacted by it in another way.  
xiii As noted above, it may be impossible to harm or benefit future individuals and so forth but nothing here 
relies on that being possible. One need not even care if climate change brings about good and bad states of affairs 
for future individuals etc. For, climate change will harm and benefit some presently existing individuals etc.  
xiv (Joyce & Keigwin, 2003). 
xv Again, to generate the problem we need not suppose that we can harm or benefit future individuals and so 
forth. So, this article’s argument need not contend with the non-identity problem.  
xvi Similarly, (Sterba 1995) argues that species may benefit from the death of their weaker members.  
xvii Allowing climate change to continue unabated is, after all, one such policy. 
xviii Those who are only concerned about nature’s interests or about rights violations might, for instance, argue 
that the non-identity problem gives one reason to reject this claim. For, we cannot benefit or harm these things by 
bringing them into existence or failing to do so. Nor do future species, ecosystems, and so forth have rights that 
can be violated in this way. (Rights-theorists might say, however, that we violate rights of currently non-existent 
individuals and so forth when we bring them into being very poorly off -- even when only alternative was to 
cause other beings to come into existence).  
xix Taylor advances a series of priority principles but other biocentrists offer fewer or none at all. See, for 
instance: (Schweitzer 1923;  Sterba 1995; Taylor 1986). 
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xx It might even be good, in some circumstances, to bring new species, ecosystems and so forth into existence. 
Consider the choice between pushing two buttons. If you push the first button you will bring into existence a 
lifeless planet. If you push the second, you will bring into existence a living planet with many individuals and 
ecosystems. Most people would probably push the second button. Or consider a more realistic example. If a 
degraded ecosystem cannot be restored, it might sometimes be good, to bring into existence some other 
ecosystem in the area. 
xxi Attempts to address climate change may bring greater harm to things that matter and, so, be unacceptable. 
Even if mitigation is required, different mitigation strategies will impact different parts of nature in different 
ways and, so, it is not clear which mitigation strategy is best.  
xxii For discussion of different accounts of harm see: (Feinberg, 1984; Frankfurt, 1988; Hassoun, 2009c).  
xxiii Presumably, some birds that fly into windmills would have existed even if we had not caused climate 
change. If one objects to this example, however, it is possible to provide another. 
xxiv For one of the most extensive ethics that attempts to address the problem of climate change see (Attfield 
1999). Attfield does not, however, believe that ecosystems and species have non-instrumental value. 
xxv I set aside here general worries about whether or not traditional versions of consequentialism can guide 
action. 
xxvi For discussion of consequentialism in environmental ethics and its incompleteness see: (Jamieson, 2003). 
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xxvii Inclusive environmental ethicists are not the only one’s that have this kind of problem. Many theories are 
incomplete and cannot tell us what to do about important challenges like climate change. Even some liberal 
theories that endorse more than one kind of freedom may face this sort of problem. Because they believe almost 
everything matters, however, the problem of incompleteness is particularly pressing for inclusive environmental 
ethicists. 
xxviii Of course, there are similarly difficult and divisive empirical questions about how climate change will 
affect individuals, species, ecosystems, and the biosphere (IPCC, 2007 2007, 20). This article will focus 
primarily on figuring out what to do in the face of massive normative (as opposed to empirical) uncertainties. 
Some of the conclusions it will arrive at may, however, help in dealing with empirical uncertainties. 
xxix I owe thanks to Jason Matteson for this point and to Ron Sandler for encouraging me to take very seriously 
the harms climate change may bring.  
xxx Note that an inclusive environmental ethic might even fail to fulfill its author’s desiderata for a good theory 
without being valueless. 
xxxi Many of Schmidtz’s examples show how it is possible to protect nature even without modifying property 
rights. 
xxxii Of course, this article started from the observation that resolving these tensions requires some moral 
knowledge but, as the cases above illustrate, we often have the relevant knowledge. If all the things inclusive 
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environmental ethicists care about matter then we know, for instance, that there is reason to protect both 
individuals and ecosystems in Yellowstone. 
xxxiii There are many methods for doing this. For discussion of some see: (Sit & Taylor, 1998). Adaptive 
management strategies might include some experimental and non-experimental research as well.  
xxxiv Perhaps this section’s arguments would be buttressed by a general commitment to some sort of 
particularism on which we can have moral knowledge on the ground without a complete theory.  
xxxv They might, for instance, succeed in deriving climate change policy from a complete and plausible theory 
by focusing right now on doing more environmental ethics. 
xxxvi This may apply to other large scale problems as well. 
xxxvii This might be so if the initial permits are auctioned off to those with the greatest ability to pay. For, then, 
the poorest will have to buy the permits they need for sustenance emissions. 
xxxviii Perhaps because they have been around longer, many anthropocentric theories are also much more 
developed (consider, for instance, John Rawls’ theory of justice). They have to be extended, however, to account 
for environmental values. On this also see: (Gardiner, 2009a; Gardiner, 2009b). 
xxxix In the present case, we have seen how inclusive environmental ethicists might suggest that there are some 
reasons for optimism. 
